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Many elected officials in both theUnited States and United Kingdomhave expressed heightened interest
in fostering an ownership society. Endowing all
children with savings accounts, perhaps even
starting at birth, is one way of trying to achieve
that goal. Proponents have ascribed many
financial and social benefits to such universal
accounts, including an introduction to the prin-
ciples of saving and finance, an increase in the
number of low- to moderate-income households
that are banked, and a way to save for educa-
tion, homeownership, or retirement. The overar-
ching goal of these accounts, however, is to give
all children a strong economic footing.
A question, then, for analysts is how well
universal children’s savings accounts (CSAs)
can help families make strides toward all these
goals or whether CSAs are better suited to
accomplishing some goals and not others. For
instance, would children’s savings accounts
allow holders to accumulate meaningful sav-
ings for an education or a down payment on a
home? Would accumulated balances perceptibly
stem growing wealth inequality? Of the wealth
accumulated, how much is through private con-
tributions and investment earnings and how
much is through government redistribution?
Or, would the greater role of CSAs be in extend-
ing financial education to all?
The answers to these questions lie in how
CSAs are designed and what we might reason-
ably assume about the accounts’ performance
and households’ participation. This paper uses
the Urban Institute’s DYNASIM model to esti-
mate the wealth-building impact of CSAs under
alternative scenarios that vary the design fea-
tures. The analysis begins with a “bare bones”
CSA design that includes only a federal seed
amount and then adds features—like supple-
mental grants, federal matches, private contri-
butions, and non-taxability—one at a time to
estimate their marginal impact. Most of the fea-
tures we experiment with are similar to those in
the ASPIRE Act, which proposes to establish
CSAs for American children. The results high-
light how the design of CSAs influences which
children benefit from the accounts, the amount
of new wealth that results from the subsidies,
and the extent to which government or private
saving is the source of wealth accumulation.
We begin by discussing the major design
features of CSAs. We then present details of the
ASPIRE Act. Next we describe the DYNASIM
model, how we model private contributions to
CSAs, and how we project account balances. We
then describe the parameters of our simulations.
Finally, we present estimates of account bal-
ances under the different CSA assumptions.
Major Design Features of CSAs
In this section, we introduce a number of issues
to consider in designing CSAs. First, we present
arguments for and against universal accounts.
Then we describe the different ways in which
government might subsidize CSAs. Next we
discuss how CSAs might be administered.
Finally, we show why it is important to consider
the impact of inflation on CSAs.
Universal Accounts
The natural question for lawmakers is whether
every child should receive a children’s savings
account. The argument against universality—
particularly where federal direct spending or
tax subsidies are concerned—is that well-off
1
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families already have the means to save for their
children. Also, if the purpose of these accounts is
to improve the distribution of wealth, then a
proposal that gives roughly equal benefits to
both poor and rich would do less to level the
playing field (in relative terms) than a more
means-tested approach. Evidence from the
Survey of Consumer Finances, for example,
suggests that most households below median
income have only modest positive net worth
(Johnson, Mensah, and Steuerle 2006; Carasso
and McKernan 2007). However, a strong argu-
ment for providing universal accounts is that
universality makes financial education a uni-
versal good. A related effect is that universality
helps corral the financial services industry
to service all households. Today, significant
portions of that industry often shunt aside
lower-income households by refusing small ac-
counts or providing almost no return on them.
A related issue is who gets the accounts.
Should it be every newborn child or every child
under 18? Should it be tied only to parents who
work? The first approach is common, as it allows
gradual development of the program, while
eventually garnering the advantages of univer-
sality just noted. Because it would exclude the
recently born, however, it raises issues of fairness;
for example, low-income parents who had their
third and last child in 2007 could not participate
in a CSAdesigned for those born in 2008 or later.
Federal Subsidies
There are four ways the federal government can
subsidize the CSAs of qualifying participants:
seeding, supplemental grants, federal matches
against private contributions, and tax treatment
of account savings. Each subsidy type influ-
ences the level of participation, the net private
savings created, the overall balance accumu-
lated under the account, and the cost to the gov-
ernment of the CSA program.
Seed funding. A CSAwould be opened in the
child’s name (and Social Security number) with
a federal seed grant. Some current proposals
suggest a seed of $500. While the preference
among CSAproponents is to provide all partic-
ipants with the same seed amount, the seed
could be means tested—for example, phasing
out for those households with income above the
national median or some other threshold. Since
the family is not required to contribute, the seed
encourages private saving mainly by providing
bank accounts to which people may add. It also
encourages financial education for all citizens on
how wealth grows and compounds over time.
Supplemental grants. Supplemental grants
provide some additional support on a means-
tested basis. The government might make such
grants just in the initial year. Alternatively, the
government might make supplemental grants
periodically throughout the years until the child
reaches age 18. For example, while all children’s
accounts might receive a $500 seed at inception,
supplemental grants up to an additional $500
could be awarded based on need to those chil-
dren in households with incomes below the
median and phased out as income rises above
this level. Like seed funding, supplemental
grants aim to improve welfare gains and the
distribution of wealth, but they still require no
additional private saving at the margin.
Matches. One aim of CSAs might be to help
families build private assets. Some research
suggests that matches provided against private
contributions might effectively encourage addi-
tional private saving among some households
(Duflo et al. 2006). Government could match
private contributions dollar for dollar, 50 cents
per dollar, or at other rates. Some may argue for
a multi-rate match structure, with the rate of
federal match decreasing as household income
rises. Importantly, the match could occur in
addition to or instead of a supplemental grant.
Taxability. The non-taxability of the govern-
ment grants and the interest they earn is itself a
subsidy. For a person in a 20 percent tax bracket,
as an example, a $500 tax-free government grant
to a CSA is equal to a $625 taxable government
grant. If both the grant and the interest are tax
free, the effective government grant is even
more valuable.
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Administration
A national system of universal children’s
savings accounts could be administered in
various ways. (For a detailed discussion, see
Cramer 2006.) For example, at one end of the
spectrum is a system of federally administered
accounts where the proceeds are invested by
one or more private financial institutions the
government selects. However, the government
decides the overall investment mix and applies
it to the pooled CSAwealth. A government
agency, likely in cooperation with the Social
Security Administration if Social Security
numbers are used, might be tasked with
 assigning accounts to all newborn
children;
 tracking down households that fail to
open accounts or do not have current
addresses;
 properly crediting federal subsidies—
if there are means-tested grants, then
household income and information on
the child beneficiary is necessary to cor-
rectly award them, thus requiring coordi-
nation with IRS tax reporting or other
agency income reporting;
 properly crediting private contributions—
from the designated head of household,
other family, friends, employers, charities,
and the like—to each child’s accounts;
 providing periodic financial statements
to households that tally each child
account balance, including total federal
subsidies, private contributions, and
investment earnings to date; and
 determining whether account with-
drawals are allowable based on child’s
age and purpose.
The costs to the government—including
fees to the participating financial institutions—
would be paid from account fees or from gen-
eral revenue.
At the other end of the spectrum is a pri-
vately run system—but perhaps still subject to
federal coordination, oversight, and guidelines.
For example, federally certified financial institu-
tions would compete to provide and manage
accounts for each child. Providers would be
required to supply interested households with
easy-to-read information on investment offer-
ings, fund performance, and administration fees
so households could make informed choices
among competing providers. Households
would decide the investment strategy (likely
within certain federal guidelines), although
providers would need to offer a “smart” invest-
ment default. Upon opening a CSA (or receiving
one that a family has transferred from another
financial institution), the provider would fur-
nish information identifying the household
and the CSA beneficiary to the IRS to ensure
proper calculation and crediting of any federal
grants. Providers would assess an annual
investment fee on the account balance plus
additional fees that compensate them for the
administrative intensity of account manage-
ment. Additional federal subsidies to providers
might be necessary to ensure universal enroll-
ment, provider profitability, and meaningful
account accumulations.
Indexation
While inflation has been relatively low so far this
decade, it still exerts a pernicious effect on savings
over time. For example, if in 2007 Congress intro-
duced a simple CSAwith a $500 initial seed and
an annual contribution limit of $1,000—but with-
out indexing these parameters to inflation—then
children born in 2025 would receive a seed contri-
bution of just $297 and their parents would face a
contribution limit of only $595 a year in today’s
dollars (assuming past inflationary experience
continues). Therefore, an important consideration
for lawmakers is whether and how often to adjust
CSAparameters and thresholds for inflation.
ASPIRE Act of 2007
This section presents details of the ASPIRE Act.
Many of these design features are similar to the
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design features we experiment with in our CSA
simulations.
In October 2007, some members of Congress
introduced the America Saving for Personal
Investment, Retirement, and Education Act
(“The ASPIRE Act”) which, like the United
Kingdom Child Trust Fund, would endow
every newborn with a savings account (“KIDS
account”) of $500. Children in households with
incomes below the national median would be
eligible for a supplemental government con-
tribution of up to $500 at birth. The supple-
mental amount would be progressive so
children would receive the full amount if their
household income was at or below 50 percent
of the national median adjusted gross income
(AGI) and 10 dollars less for each percentage
point that their household income was above
50 percent of the national median AGI. At
75 percent of the national median AGI, for ex-
ample, the supplement would be only $250, and
at 100 percent, the supplement would be zero.
Unlike the United Kingdom Child Trust
Fund, the KIDS accounts would provide dollar-
for-dollar federal matches on private contribu-
tions up to $500 a year, phased out for families
with AGI between 100 percent and 120 percent
of the national median. Families and friends
could make after-tax contributions of up to
$2,000 a year. Every five years, the seed, supple-
ment, and contribution thresholds would be
indexed to inflation. These accounts would be
administered by the Treasury Department, simi-
lar to how the Thrift Savings Plan for federal
employees is administered. (See appendix A for
descriptions of the British and Canadian chil-
dren’s savings account programs.)
Methodology
We use the Urban Institute’s DYNASIM micro-
simulation model to simulate CSAs. DYNASIM
works with a demographically representative
population of the United States. In DYNASIM,
we first assign mothers an account for each child
born. These accounts are started with the initial
seed amount and any supplemental government
contribution. We then track the accumulations
over time, accounting for any contributions,
government matches, and tax benefits associated
with the particular policy simulation.
DYNASIM starts with a self-weighting sam-
ple of 103,072 individuals taken from the 1990
to 1993 Survey of Income and Program Partic-
ipation (SIPP). The model ages this starting
sample in yearly increments to 2050, using
parameters estimated from longitudinal data
sources. It integrates many important trends
and differentials in life course processes, includ-
ing birth, death, schooling, leaving home, first
marriage, remarriage, divorce, disability, work,
and earnings. DYNASIM also simulates the
major sources of wealth and income. The Urban
Institute recently added federal and state in-
come tax calculators to DYNASIM and, through
a statistical match with IRS individual income
tax return data, imputed itemized deductions,
sources of investment income (capital gains,
dividends, interest) and other variables needed
to compute tax liability. (See Favreault and
Smith 2004 for a fuller description of each mod-
ule used in DYNASIM.)
Modeling Private Contributions
One goal of children’s accounts proposals is to
motivate family and non-family members to
make private contributions. In order to simulate
the wealth buildup in CSAs, we must first esti-
mate the likelihood that individuals will con-
tribute. Then, for those expected to contribute,
we must estimate their expected level of contri-
butions. To facilitate modeling these accounts,
we make several key assumptions. First, we
ignore any potential household budgetary
restrictions regarding the level of contributions.
Additionally, since we do not have data on how
contributions change with additional children,
we assume that children in the household
receive the same contribution they would if
they were the only child in the household.
Anecdotal evidence that friends and extended
family members also contribute to CSAs pro-
vides some support for these assumptions.
C H I L D R E N ’ S S AV I N G S A C C O U N T S
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Probability of contributing. To determine who
contributes to these accounts, we rely on data
in the 2001 SIPP. Based on a sample of mothers
with children under age 18, we estimate a logit
model of contributions to IRAs and Keoghs
controlling for education, race, marital status,
homeownership, and income quartile. Using the
coefficients from the model, we estimate the
likelihood that each individual in DYNASIM
contributes to a CSA in each year.
Because this probability is based on IRA and
Keogh contributions, which do not benefit from
a government match, we adjust the probability
to control for the effect of matches using infor-
mation from Duflo and colleagues (2006) on the
relationship between IRAparticipation rates and
match rates. (See appendix B for a description of
the authors’ experiment.) The authors report a
2.90 percent IRAparticipation rate for individu-
als who received no match and a 13.98 percent
take-up rate for those who received a 50 percent
match.1 Under ASPIRE, match rates range from
0 to 100 percent depending on an individual’s
AGI relative to the national median. Based on
the findings of Duflo and colleagues (2006), we
linearly interpolate and extrapolate participation
rates across the entire range of matches from 0 to
100 percent. We assume that the percentage of
people participating, R, is a linear function of the
match rate, M, where:
R = 2.9 + .2216 * M
Using this formula, we can estimate the
participation rate for any match rate. For exam-
ple, we estimate a 7.3 percent participation rate
for those receiving a 20 percent match, which is
roughly consistent with the Duflo and col-
leagues (2006) estimate of 7.7 percent. We then
compute the ratio of the matched contribution
rate to the unmatched contribution rate and use
this ratio to adjust each individual’s predicted
probability of contributing to represent his or
her probability of contributing under the partic-
ular match rate.
Individuals are assigned a constant random
number drawn from a uniform distribution on
the interval [0,1] that represents their overall
propensity to contribute to a CSA. The random
number is compared with the match-adjusted
probability of contributing in a given year, and,
if larger, the individual makes contributions to a
CSA. In the absence of a match, we estimate that
4.5 percent of accounts will ever receive contri-
butions. In the presence of a match, we estimate
that the contribution rate will more than triple
and that 15.1 percent of accounts will ever re-
ceive contributions.
Contribution amounts. We use the same
SIPP sample of mothers with children under
age 18 to estimate an ordinary least squares
(OLS) model of contribution amounts, again
controlling for education, race, marital status,
homeownership, and income quartile. Since
the contribution level is also based on IRA and
Keogh contributions, which do not benefit from
a government match, we adjust the estimated
level of contributions to control for the effect of
matches.
Among those who made IRA contributions,
Duflo and colleagues (2006) report average con-
tributions of about $765, $1,102, and $1,108 at
the 0, 20, and 50 percent match rates, respec-
tively. Based on the authors’ findings, we lin-
early interpolate and extrapolate contribution
levels across the entire range of matches from
0 to 100 percent. Because the marginal effect of
increasing the match rate is much larger be-
tween 0 and 20 percent than between 20 and
50 percent, we linearly interpolate contribution
amounts at or below the 20 percent match rate
separately from contribution amounts above the
20 percent match rate. We assume that contribu-
tions, S, are a linear function of the match rate,
M, with a kink at the 20 percent match rate,
where:
765.10 + 16.86 * M if 0 ≤ M ≤ 20
S =
1102.30 + .1967 * (M - 20) if M > 20
We compute the ratio of the matched con-
tribution level to the unmatched contribution
level. Since most people face an individual max-
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imum IRAdeduction, we also compute the ratio
of the CSA contribution limit in each year to the
IRA limit of $3,000. We then multiply each indi-
vidual’s predicted contribution level by the first
ratio and the second ratio to represent his or her
predicted contribution level given his or her
match rate under ASPIRE. This method controls
for both the lower contribution limits for chil-
dren’s accounts than for IRAs and the indexed
contribution limits over time. Government
matches are then determined by multiplying
the individual’s contribution by the match rate.
Estimating CSA Tax Burdens
Amajor goal of our analysis is to determine the
distribution of tax benefits under various policy
scenarios. To do this, we compare each account’s
accrued interest first by assuming it is not taxed
and then by assuming it is taxed. We call the
difference in accruals the tax subsidy. We esti-
mate marginal tax rates using the tax calculator
in DYNASIM and assuming that tax rates are
constant over the lifetime of the account.
Formally, the balance of the account in its first
year is the sum of the seed, the government
supplement, any private contributions in that
year, C0, and any federal match, M0. This is rep-
resented by:
NoTaxAccount0 = Seed + Supplement + C0 + M0
In the years that follow, the account grows
by the interest rate and any contributions and
matches that are added to it. The balance of the
nontaxable account in year y is:
NoTaxAccounty = (NoTaxAccounty-1)(1 + iy-1) + Cy + My
where iy-1 is the nominal interest rate in year y-1,
Cy is the private contribution made in year y,
and My is the federal match on that contribution.
In the taxable scenario, we reduce account earn-
ings by the individual’s marginal tax rate. Thus,
the account balance in the year of birth remains:
TaxAccount0 = Seed + Supplement + C0 + M0
but in each subsequent year y, the balance is cal-
culated as:
TaxAccounty = (TaxAccounty-1)(1 + iy-1(1 - ty-1)) + Cy + My
where interest earnings are reduced by the pre-
vious year’s marginal tax rate, ty-1. The total tax
subsidy over the lifetime of the account is the
difference between account accumulations
under the taxable and nontaxable scenarios,
represented as:
Subsidy = (NoTaxAccount18 – TaxAccount18)
Assumptions in Modeling CSAs
Although some CSA proposals allow early
withdrawals subject to a penalty, we do not
allow any withdrawals before the child reaches
age 18. Administrative costs, meanwhile, are
subsumed into the interest rate. Under these
assumptions, we grow the accounts by an
annual nominal rate of return of 5.8 percent.
When the child turns 18, we measure the accu-
mulations in the account in real 2008 dollars,
which implies an annual real return of 3.0 per-
cent. We exclude the small number of cases
where mothers die before the accounts reach
maturity, since we do not have the ability to
continue to estimate tax burdens or contribu-
tions for them.
Simulations
Using DYNASIM, we simulate CSAs for chil-
dren born between 2007 and 2032. Through
their mothers, we follow them until they turn
age 18 (between 2025 and 2050). We model four
options—each option building on the former—
assuming taxability and non-taxability.
Under the first option, the government
endows all newborn children with an initial seed
amount of $500. The second option adds
a supplemental grant of up to $500 for children
in households below the national median AGI.
Like the ASPIREAct, this supplemental amount
is progressive so children receive the full
amount if their household income is at or below
C H I L D R E N ’ S S AV I N G S A C C O U N T S
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50 percent of the national median AGI and 10
dollars less for each percentage point that their
household income is above 50 percent of the
national median AGI. The third option allows
private contributions on top of the seed and sup-
plemental grants. Under this option, families
and friends can make after-tax contributions up
to $1,000 a year. (In the actual ASPIREAct of
2007, the contribution limit is $2,000.) The fourth
option adds a government match. The govern-
ment matches private contributions dollar for
dollar up to the maximum contribution amount.
The matched amount is phased out for families
with income between 100 percent and 120 per-
cent of national median AGI. To ease the
explanation of results, we assume the seed, sup-
plement, contribution limits, and match limits
are indexed annually for inflation even though
ASPIRE does this only once every five years.
Results
This section describes the results of the simula-
tions by the mother’s characteristics, specifically
her quintile of average income over the life of
the account, as well as her education and race.
We begin by examining how account balances at
maturity (i.e., when the child turns age 18) vary
under the different CSA options. We then assess
the importance of various income sources to the
overall account balances. Next we explore the
level and distribution of tax subsidies created
by CSAs. We report average account balances at
maturity in 2008 dollars.
Account Balances under the
Different CSA Options
Under the first option, the government gives
every child $500 at birth in 2008 dollars. At
maturity, 18 years later, the average account
would be worth $851 in 2008 dollars because of
compound interest (table 1). Differences by edu-
cation and race reflect both the composition of
the future population and the future number of
births per mother.
Under the second option, in which the gov-
ernment supplements low-income children’s
accounts with up to an additional $500 at birth,
the average account balance increases by $287 to
$1,138. Because the supplement is progressive,
average account balances range from $947 for
children in the highest quintile of average
income to $1,355 for those in the lowest quin-
tile. Since minority children and those whose
mothers do not have high school degrees tend
to be low income, they are most likely to receive
the government supplement and will have
higher average account balances than their
counterparts.
However, some children in higher socioeco-
nomic groups will also receive the government
supplement. Because the supplement is based
on household income in one year only, a num-
ber of children in upwardly mobile families will
receive it. So also will children in other families
with higher-than-average incomes if those in-
comes are volatile—high one year and low the
next. For example, children born to graduate
students will get a subsidy because they are low
income in those initial years, but over their life-
times their families will tend to move into
higher income classes.
Under the third option, family and friends
can contribute up to $1,000 a year to CSAs. As
mentioned earlier, to the extent that IRAs provide
a base for comparison, we project that
4.5 percent of accounts will ever receive private
contributions; however, this estimate will vary
significantly by income, education, and race (fig-
ure 1). For example, only 1.7 percent of accounts
in the lowest income quintile will receive pri-
vate contributions compared with 6.8 percent of
those in the highest income quintile. And less
then 1 percent of children whose mothers do not
have high school degrees will receive private
contributions to their accounts. In contrast, 8.5
percent of children whose mothers have at least
some college education will receive private con-
tributions. Private contributions average $273 per
account and range from $39 for accounts in the
lowest income quintile to $596 for those in the
highest income quintile (figure 2). Average con-
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tributions are highest for children with college-
educated or white non-Hispanic mothers. As a
result of private contributions, the average
account balance increases by another $359 to
$1,497 at maturity (see table 1). And the progres-
sivity of the supplement is offset by the regres-
sivity of private contributions. Of course, other
efforts, such as those of philanthropy, could
make the system more progressive.
Average account balances at maturity in-
crease the most under the fourth option that in-
cludes a government match—an option similar
in design to the 2007 ASPIREAct. This increase
results from a dollar-for-dollar government
match, which averages $350 per account (fig-
ure 3, page 10). Because the government match is
intended to increase both the contribution rate
and level of contributions among lower-income
families, the match is capped and then phased
out for families with incomes between 100 per-
cent and 120 percent of national medianAGI.
However, even children from families in the
highest income quintile average a government
match of $146. Again, this is because a number
of children will be born into upwardly mobile
families.
We project that the government match will
have its intended effect and will significantly
increase both the rate and level of private con-
tributions. The overall contribution rate would
more than triple from 4.5 percent without the
match to 15.1 percent with it (figure 4, page 11).
The government match significantly raises the
contribution rate of even the most economi-
cally vulnerable groups. About 10.0 percent of
children in the lowest income quintile are ex-
Table 1. Average Children’s Accounts Balances at Maturity and Incremental Change due to
Design Feautures (2008$)
$500 + Supp.
$500 $500 + Supp. + Contrib. ASPIRE-Like
Mean Mean Change Mean Change Mean Change
All 851 1,138 287 1,497 359 2,413 916
Quintile of average income
Lowest 851 1,355 504 1,407 52 2,239 833
Second 851 1,235 384 1,408 173 2,802 1,395
Third 851 1,123 272 1,405 282 2,590 1,185
Fourth 851 1,033 182 1,530 497 2,302 772
Highest 851 947 96 1,735 787 2,134 399
Education
Less than high school 851 1,118 267 1,206 88 1,763 557
High school graduate 851 1,190 339 1,376 186 2,062 687
College graduate 851 1,071 220 1,804 733 3,217 1,413
Race
Non-Hispanic white 851 1,127 276 1,641 514 2,831 1,191
Non-Hispanic black 851 1,296 445 1,436 140 1,959 523
Hispanic 851 1,121 269 1,301 180 1,884 583
Other minority 851 1,009 158 1,385 376 2,391 1,006
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Urban Institute’s DYNASIM3 model.
Notes: Supplements (Supp.) are up to $500 for household income at or below 50 percent of median adjusted gross income (AGI) and
$10 less for each percentage point that household income is above 50 percent of median AGI. Contributions (Contrib.) and matches
are both capped at $1,000 a year. Match is one-to-one at or below median AGI, phased out at 120 percent of median AGI. The
ASPIRE-like option includes a government match and any additional private contributions due to the match. The seed, supplement,
and contribution thresholds are indexed to inflation every year.
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Figure 1. Share of Children’s Savings Accounts That Ever Received a Contribution
4.5%
1.7%
3.4%
4.8%
6.0%
6.8%
0.8%
3.0%
8.5%
6.3%
3.0%
2.0%
5.2%
All
Race/EthnicityEducationQuintile of Average Income
Other
minority
HispanicBlackWhite> HSHS< HS5th4th3rd2nd1st
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Urban Institute’s DYNASIM3 model.
HS = high school
Note: Contributions capped at $1,000 a year, indexed to inflation every year.
Figure 2. Average Private Contribution per Children’s Savings Account (2008$)
$273
$39
$132
$215
$379
$596
$68
$142
$556
$390
$108
$137
$286
All
Race/EthnicityEducationQuintile of Average Income
Other
minority
HispanicBlackWhite> HSHS< HS5th4th3rd2nd1st
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Urban Institute’s DYNASIM3 model.
HS = high school
Note: Contributions capped at $1,000 a year, indexed to inflation every year.
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pected to receive private contributions, as will
4.0 percent of children whose mothers are not
high school graduates and 11.2 percent of non-
Hispanic black children. The amount of the
average contribution is projected to more than
double from $273 to $608 per account (figure 5,
page 12). Among children in the lowest income
quintile, average contributions are projected to
increase by 8.9 times from $39 dollars without a
match to $346 with a match, compared with just
1.2 times for the average contribution among
children in the top quintile, from $596 to $741.
As a result of the government match and the
increased rate and level of private contributions,
the average account balance under theASPIRE-
like option is projected to increase by $916 to
$2,413 at maturity (see table 1). The marginal im-
pact of this fourth option increases with income
through the second quintile as private contribu-
tions and the corresponding government match
both increase. On average, children in the lowest
income quintile will receive an additional $833 in
their CSAs and those in the second income quin-
tile will receive an additional $1,395 under this
option. But because the match is capped and then
phased out for higher-income families, the mar-
ginal impact of theASPIRE-like option declines
with income in the third, fourth, and fifth quin-
tiles. As a result, children in the highest income
quintile will receive only $399 more in their CSAs.
At maturity, ASPIRE-like account balances are
projected to be slightly higher for children in the
lowest income quintile than for those in the high-
est income quintile ($2,239 versus $2,134).
What Makes Up Account Balances
under the Different CSA Options?
We described the incremental impact of several
children’s accounts design features on account
balances. Figure 6 shows the contribution of
each source of income to the overall average
account balance under the ASPIRE-like option.
Starting with just the seed amount, the account
Figure 3. Average Government Match per Children’s Savings Account (2008$)
$350
$328
$550
$442
$284
$146
$216
$264
$535
$453
$201
$227
$377
All
Race/EthnicityEducationQuintile of Average Income
Other
minority
HispanicBlackWhite> HSHS< HS5th4th3rd2nd1st
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Urban Institute’s DYNASIM3 model.
HS = high school
Notes: Matches on contributions limited to $1,000 a year, indexed to inflation every year. Match is one-to-one at or below median
adjusted gross income (AGI), phased out at 120 percent of median AGI.
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balances are uniform across economic and
demographic groups. Government supplements
to children in low-income families shift the dis-
tribution of CSA balances toward low socioeco-
nomic groups. That is, children in the highest
income quintile average 70 percent of the mean
account balance of children in the lowest in-
come quintile. In the absence of a government
match, private contributions would tilt the dis-
tribution of account balances toward higher
socioeconomic groups. Children in the highest
income quintile average 1.38 times the average
account balance of children in the lowest in-
come quintile. In the presence of a government
match designed only for children in lower-
income families, private contributions and gov-
ernment matches even out the distribution of
CSA balances considerably. Children in the
highest income quintile now average only
98 percent of the average account balance of
children in the lowest income quintile. Also
important to all CSAs, regardless of income, is
compound interest. About one-third of all
account balances come from interest accrued
over the life of the accounts. If returns are
higher or lower than the 3.0 percent real return
assumed here, then the share due to interest
earned would similarly be higher or lower. For
instance, if higher-income individuals are able
to successfully invest in higher-return (but more
risky) assets, their average balances would be
relatively higher.
Considering the role of individuals versus
the government in building up these accounts,
we estimate that 59 percent of all the money in
CSA accounts will come from the government
and 41 percent from interest earned on the
account under the first option (table 2, page 14).
Allowing private contributions has a large
effect on what makes up account balances.
Figure 4. Share of Children’s Savings Accounts That Ever Received a Contribution,
without and with Government Match
All
Race/EthnicityEducationQuintile of Average Income
Other
minority
HispanicBlackWhite> HSHS< HS5th4th3rd2nd1st
4.5%
1.7%
3.4%
4.8%
6.0%
6.8%
3.0%
8.5%
6.3%
3.0%
2.0%
5.2%
15.1%
10.0%
14.3%
17.2%
18.3%
15.5%
4.0%
0.8%
10.8%
26.3%
20.2%
11.2%
6.8%
17.1%
Without government match
With government match 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Urban Institute’s DYNASIM3 model.
HS = high school
Notes: Matches on contributions limited to $1,000 a year, indexed to inflation every year. Match is one-to-one at or below median
adjusted gross income (AGI), phased out at 120 percent of median AGI.
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Figure 5. Average Private Contribution per Children’s Savings Account,
without and with Government Match (2008$)
All
Race/EthnicityEducationQuintile of Average Income
Other
minority
HispanicBlackWhite> HSHS< HS5th4th3rd2nd1st
Without government match
With government match 
$608
$346
$641 $650 $661
$741
$269
$393
$1,075
$826
$304
$347
$658
$142
$596
$379
$215
$132
$273
$39
$68
$556
$390
$108
$137
$286
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Urban Institute’s DYNASIM3 model.
HS = high school
Notes: Matches on contributions limited to $1,000 a year, indexed to inflation every year. Match is one-to-one at or below median
adjusted gross income (AGI), phased out at 120 percent of median AGI.
Figure 6. Average Children’s Accounts Balance at Maturity under an ASPIRE-Like Option,
by Source of Income (2008$)
Interest
Government match
Additional private contribution with match
Private contribution
Supplement
Seed
$2,413
$2,239
$2,802
$2,590
$2,134
$2,302
$1,763
$2,062
$3,217
$2,831
$1,959
$1,884
$2,391
All
Race/EthnicityEducationQuintile of Average Income
Other
minority
HispanicBlackWhite> HSHS< HS5th4th3rd2nd1st
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Urban Institute’s DYNASIM3 model.
HS = high school
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Overall, 18 percent of all the money in CSA
accounts will come from private contributions,
45 percent from the government, and 37 percent
from interest under the third option. Under this
option, the CSAs of economically disadvantaged
children benefit most from the interest earned
over the life of the accounts. For example,
among children in the lowest income quintile,
only 3 percent of all the money in CSA accounts
is from private contributions and 57 percent is
from the government. Compound interest makes
up the other 41 percent. (Of course, if the interest
is attributed to the source of contribution, then
almost all the account balance is attributable to
the government for this income group.) In con-
trast, among children in the highest income
quintile, all the money in CSA accounts is
divided equally between private contributions,
government spending, and interest.
Under the ASPIRE-like option, which
increases government spending and private
contributions, 25 percent of all the money in
CSA accounts at maturity is from private contri-
butions, 42 percent from the government, and
33 percent from interest. Slightly less than one-
sixth of the account balances held by low-income
children will come from private contributions
compared with more than one-third of the
account balances held by high-income children.
And one-half of the account balances held by
low-income children will come from the gov-
ernment compared with only one-third of those
held by high-income children. Compound inter-
est represents one-third of the account balances
for both low- and high-income children.
(Amounts may not total 100 percent due to
rounding.)
Tax Subsidies under the
Different CSA Options
Next we compare tax burdens in the absence
of CSAs to tax burdens if the accounts are taxed
as interest income (table 3, page 15). The tax
subsidy created by the seed amount averages
$160 per account. Not surprisingly, the subsidy
is generally highest for groups who typically
have higher-than-average tax rates—in effect,
those with higher-than average incomes. For
example, children in the highest income quintile
receive an average tax subsidy of $215 com-
pared with only $73 for those in the lowest
income quintile. Children whose mothers are
college graduates receive an average tax sub-
sidy of $186 compared with only $119 for chil-
dren whose mothers did not finish high school.
And non-Hispanic whites are projected to
receive higher tax subsidies than non-Hispanic
blacks or Hispanics.
A government supplement would further
increase the average tax subsidy by $45 to $205
per account. Although higher-income groups
will still receive the largest tax subsidies, the
supplement increases the tax subsidy for the
lowest income children by 60 percent from $73
to $117 per account. In contrast, the supplement
increases the tax subsidy for the highest income
children by only 11 percent from $215 to $238
per account.
Private contributions, without a govern-
ment match, increase the average tax subsidy by
$47 to $252 per account. The increase in tax sub-
sidies is expected to range from only $3 for the
lowest income children to $116 for the highest
income children.
Under the ASPIRE-like option, the average
tax subsidy would further increase by $107 to
$359 per account. Tax subsidies rise the most for
children in the middle income quintiles. The
increase is only $51 for children in the lowest
income quintile, $144 for those in the second
quintile, $158 for those in the third quintile, $116
for those in the fourth quintile, and only $64 for
children in the highest income quintile, who are
less likely to get matches over their lifetimes.
However, the highest income children will
still in total receive tax subsidies that average
2.4 times those of the lowest income children
(compare $417 with $172).
Sensitivity Analysis
As noted, we chose to model CSA contributions
based on the experience with IRAs. Another
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alternative might have been to model CSA con-
tributions based on employer-provided plans
like 401(k) plans; however, they provide a simpli-
fied employer-administered structure that is not
relevant for individually based private contribu-
tions. While 529 plans are individually based,
they are subject to state incentives and regula-
tions and are far less commonly used than IRAs.
Data on individual development accounts
(IDAs), in turn, may be useful for studying sav-
ings of low-income families, but they typically
involve much more intense hands-on advice
from the nonprofits or agencies administering
the IDAs. Thus, so far we have no real data on
the experience of a more universal IDA. Since per
capita costs of administration would have to be
reduced in a larger program, it would involve a
different participation rate than the experiments.
Experience with child accounts in the United
Kingdom is just now providing some data, but
cross-country comparisons are difficult without
knowing the viability of alternative investment
opportunities. As a practical matter, data on IRAs
are readily available for a large number of people
in the 2001 SIPP. Thus, we were able to easily
choose the population we wanted for our contri-
bution simulations and accurately use it to esti-
mate the probability of contributing to a CSA.
Having said this, we recognize that the
choice of estimation model can significantly
affect the accumulated balances. Therefore, we
perform a sensitivity analysis under which indi-
viduals are twice as likely as in the baseline to
contribute to the accounts in any given year. This
Table 3. Average Tax Subsidies for Children’s Accounts and Incremental Change
due to Design Features (2008$)
$500 + Supp.
$500 $500 + Supp. + Contrib. ASPIRE-Like
Mean Mean Change Mean Change Mean Change
All 160 205 45 252 47 359 107
Quintile of average income
Lowest 73 117 44 120 3 172 51
Second 142 206 64 223 17 366 144
Third 174 229 54 263 34 421 158
Fourth 195 236 40 302 66 418 116
Highest 215 238 23 354 116 417 64
Education
Less than high school 119 151 32 160 9 209 49
High school graduate 155 207 52 231 23 307 76
College graduate 186 226 40 325 100 502 177
Race
Non-Hispanic white 170 214 45 284 69 425 141
Non-Hispanic black 147 213 65 231 18 289 59
Hispanic 153 194 41 216 22 282 65
Other minority 148 175 27 224 49 336 112
Source: Authors’ calculations using the Urban Institute’s DYNASIM3 model.
Notes: Supplements (Supp.) are up to $500 for household income at or below 50 percent of median adjusted gross income (AGI) and
$10 less for each percentage point that household income is above 50 percent of median AGI. Contributions (Contrib.) and matches
are both capped at $1,000 a year. Match is one-to-one at or below median AGI, phased out at 120 percent of median AGI. The
ASPIRE-like option includes a government match and any additional private contributions due to the match. The seed, supplement,
and contribution thresholds are indexed to inflation every year. The tax subsidy is the difference in account accruals assuming they
are not taxed and then assuming they are taxed.
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analysis results in 9.1 percent of accounts ever
receiving private contributions in the absence of
a match, up from 4.5 percent under the baseline
(not shown). Under this alternative we find that
29.9 percent of accounts ever receive contribu-
tions with the ASPIRE match, up from 15.1 per-
cent under the baseline. As a result of the higher
contribution rate in the sensitivity analysis, aver-
age balances in the ASPIRE-like accounts are
expected to be 51 percent higher than they are
in the baseline ($3,653 versus $2,413).
The sensitivity analysis has the largest effect
on children in the highest income quintile, rais-
ing their average account balances by 58 percent
from $2,134 under the baseline to $3,370 (not
shown). And, it has the smallest effect on those
in the lowest income quintile, raising their
average account balances by 36 percent from
$2,239 under the baseline to $3,056. As a result,
increasing the CSA contribution rate changes
the distribution of account balances. Under the
sensitivity analysis, ASPIRE-like account bal-
ances are projected to be 10 percent higher for
children in the highest income quintile than for
those in the lowest income quintile (not shown).
Under the baseline, account balances are pro-
jected to be 5 percent lower for children in the
highest income quintile than for those in the
lowest income quintile.
Ultimately, the likelihood and level of pri-
vate contributions depends on what other
options are available, any tax preferences avail-
able under those options, marketing by govern-
ment and private institutions, and many other
factors. Therefore, our results should be inter-
preted with caution, indicative more of the
direction and distribution of account balances
than of their ultimate levels.
Conclusions
Our simulations show that the design of chil-
dren’s savings accounts is extremely important.
We estimate that assets built up in children’s
accounts will average about $2,413. Even
assuming that contribution rates are twice as
high as those we estimate, average account bal-
ances would still be modest—approximately
$3,653. While this amount is significantly lower
than the cost of higher education or a house, it
could still be very important in helping get chil-
dren, particularly those in low-income families,
into financial instruments where they can see
the value of saving and of compound interest.
To the extent that a primary goal of child ac-
counts is financial literacy and getting children
and low-income families banked, however,
design options other than those examined here
might be considered. For instance, when it
comes to education, it may be more important
to provide accounts to school children and less
of an issue whether these accounts start at birth.
Also, although account balances may only be
modest for many individuals, the simple avail-
ability of such accounts provides a strong
motive for financial institutions to get almost
everyone banked. That, indeed, seems to be one
of the main lessons from the United Kingdom.
How much net new saving is generated
from additional government matches to pri-
vate saving is unclear, since many, particularly
higher-income, people can simply transfer
money they had already saved (or were plan-
ning on saving) from a taxable account into
these new children’s savings accounts. The one
major exception may be for those who have few
assets in the first place who cannot easily substi-
tute one form of saving for another.
Two important conclusions from this analy-
sis are that taxability matters and that it is hard
to target subsidies based on annual income to
those with low average incomes over time.
Under the CSA design features we considered,
including the basic grant, non-taxability distrib-
utes significantly more benefits to higher-income
groups than to lower-income groups. In addi-
tion, our analysis shows that because many
families experience mobility over their lifetimes,
a significant portion of benefits conditioned on
low annual income will accrue to middle- and
higher-income families.
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Appendix A:
Current Children’s Accounts Programs
While a number of countries have implemented
or are considering implementing children’s
accounts, we summarize programs in the
United Kingdom and Canada.
Child Trust Funds (United Kingdom)
In April 2005, the United Kingdom launched the
Child Trust Fund program for all children born
on and after September 1, 2002. Child Trust
Funds, or CTFs, are universal savings accounts
into which the government deposits £250 ($520)
at birth and which are administered through
the private sector. Children in the poorest
families—those receiving the child tax credit
(CTC) with household incomes below the CTC
threshold—receive an additional £250. The
government makes another deposit to every
child’s account on his or her seventh birthday
that, like the seed amount, is progressive.
Families and friends can make tax-deferred
contributions up to £1,200 ($2,497) a year.
The accounts accrue interest until the child’s
18th birthday when they are no longer CTF
accounts. In 2006, there were 300,000 CTF
accounts. Based on data from three providers
making up 38 percent of the market, Sodha
(2006) found that one-third of higher-income
accounts and one-fifth of lower-income
accounts had private contributions.
Registered Education Savings Plans
(Canada)
Canada’s version of child savings accounts is
intended only for education, is available to all
children under age 18, and is voluntary.2 These
Registered Education Savings Plans (RESPs) are
offered by financial institutions and have a life-
time limit of $50,000 per beneficiary (there is no
annual contribution limit). Government sub-
sidies to these accounts come in the form of
means-tested seed amounts and annual supple-
mental grants, as well as matches.
The Canada Learning Bond (CLB) is a
means-tested tax subsidy that comprises both
an initial seed and supplemental annual grants.
That is, children do not automatically receive a
seed subsidy. The CLB is available to children
born January 1, 2004, and later that have social
insurance numbers and reside in households
earning under $37,178.3 After opening an RESP
account, the government deposits a learning
bond of $500 (although it also provides up to
$25 to defray the costs of opening an account).
As long as the family remains income eligible,
the child’s account will receive annual $100 sup-
plements (including in the year of birth) up to
age 15. The child lifetime maximum in learning
bonds is $2,000 ($500 plus 15 years times $100).
Receipt of the CLB is linked to receipt of the
National Child Benefit Supplement, a monthly
welfare payment.
The Canada Education Savings Grant
(CESG) is a government match against the first
$500 of private contributions. In 2007, the grant
paid
 40 cents per dollar for net family income
of $37,178 or less;
 30 cents per dollar for net family income
between $37,178 and $74,357; and
 20 cents per dollar for net family income
more than $74,357.
For contributions greather than $500, the
CESG could add up to $400 on the next $2,000.
The CESG pays a maximum of $500 a year and
$7,200 per child’s lifetime. Three million chil-
dren have benefited from the CESG.
The RESP account itself stays open a maxi-
mum of 26 years. Students can start receiving
money from the account as soon as they are
enrolled in a qualified postsecondary educa-
tional program. If a child does not elect to at-
tend college, then all subsidies received return
to the government.
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Appendix B: Saving Incentives for
Low- and Middle-Income Families
Esther Duflo and colleagues (2006) conducted
an experiment that used H&R Block’s Express
IRA (X-IRA) product, which allows tax prepara-
tion clients to choose to make IRA contributions
using all or part of their federal tax refund. The
experiment was run in 60 H&R Block tax prep-
aration offices in 2005. Each client who filed a
tax return was randomly assigned one of three
match rates for X-IRA contributions: no match
(the control group), a 20 percent match, or a
50 percent match. Contributions up to $1,000
a person ($2,000 a couple) were eligible for
matching.
The authors found that matching had large
effects on IRA participation. Only 3 percent of
the control group (no match) contributed to an
X-IRA, versus 8 percent and 14 percent in the
20 percent and 50 percent match groups, respec-
tively. Matching also significantly affected par-
ticipants’ contributions: average contribution
levels (excluding the match) were $765 in the
control group, compared with $1,100 and $1,110
in the 20 percent and 50 percent match groups.
The authors noted that the average value of
IRA deposits was 4.5 and 10 times larger in the
20 percent and 50 percent match groups than in
the control group.
Duflo and colleagues also found that the
effect of the match on participation was larger
for individuals who had higher incomes, other
saving, and who were married. However, the
effect of the match was significant even for indi-
viduals in the lowest income quartile, who were
three times as likely to contribute to an X-IRA if
assigned to the 50 percent match group rather
than the control group (7.5 versus 2.5 percent).
Finally, the authors noted strong “tax pre-
parer effects.” Tax preparers having more ex-
perience with X-IRAs before the experiment
garnered much larger contributions from their
clients (for those in the matching groups).
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Notes
1. Other experiments have obtained different results.
However, comparisons are difficult because the experi-
ments all differ in incentives, clientele, and other factors. A
prime example is the recent Child Trust Fund program
begun in the United Kingdom in 2005. (See Cramer 2007 for
details and results—although contribution rates and contri-
bution amounts are reported cumulatively rather than
annually.) Another United States example, the D2D
(“Doorways to Dreams”) Fund, Inc., operated a program in
2007 in partnership with H&R Block at four Volunteer
Income TaxAssistance sites that offered United States sav-
ings bonds to clients with federal refunds of $50 or more
(Zinsmeyer and Flacke 2007). Six percent of clients chose to
purchase bonds (4.5 percent yield), spending an average of
$184 each. While there was no match offered, 68 percent of
those actually purchasing savings bonds did so for their
children and grandchildren while another 4 percent bought
them for relatives. One interpretation is that the presence of
children increased the likelihood of contributing.
2. While there are no age limits on Registered Education
Savings Plans, the education savings incentives (i.e.,
Canada Learning Bond and Canada Education Savings
Grant) are only available to children under age 18.
3. At the time of writing, a Canadian dollar almost exactly
equaled a United States dollar.
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